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STATUES 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992 as Amended) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARIE PENROD 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DALE PENROD 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 940383-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals had o r i g i n a l a p p e l l a t e 
jurisdict ion in th i s matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-
2a-3(2) ( i ) (1992 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Defendant contends that the trial court committed error 
in awarding alimony to the Plaintiff in this case based upon the 
criteria established by the Utah appellate courts. In reviewing 
an alimony award, the trial court is given considerable 
discretion to provide for spousal support, and such an award 
will not be over turned on appeal unless there has been a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 
P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1984); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 
(Utah App. 1993); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
Secondly, the Defendant contends that the court abused its 
discretion in requiring the Defendant to maintain a life 
insurance policy with a death beefit of $100,000.00. The 
Defendant contends that the trial court intended the life 
insurance to secure the alimony award and inasmuch as the alimony 
award was improperly imposed, the requirement placed on the 
Defendant to maintain a life insurance policy should likewise be 
abated. The Defendant also contends that the amount of any 
required life insurance should reflect the present value of the 
alimony award. Trial court's have "considerable discretion in 
determining the financial interest of divorced parties." Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993). Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, property and alimony 
awards "will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion if demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
The third issue relates to the trial court's error in 
determining that certain property received by the Defendant as 
part of his inheritance, became marital property. Trial courts 
should generally award property acquired by inheritance to that 
party together with any appreciation or enhancement of its 
value. A trial court's determination is only disturbed where 
there is "a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988); 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff commenced this action on August 13, 1992, 
seeking a decree of divorce and orders relating to real and 
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personal property, debts and obligations, alimony, life 
insurance, pension and profit sharing plans and attorney fees. 
The Defendant answered the Complaint on September 5, 1992. 
An Amended Order resolving the temporary issues in the case was 
entered on November 23, 1992. 
The matter was tried by the parties on July 28, 1993. The 
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree 
of Divorce on June 14, 1994. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 
June 28, 1994. 
PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE 
1. The Complaint was filed on August 13, 1992 (R. 1-4). 
The Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint on September 25, 
1992 (R. 36-37). 
2. As a result of a hearing on the Plaintiff's Order to 
Show Cause, the court entered an Amended Order resolving the 
temporary issues between the parties on November 23, 1992 (R. 41-
42). 
3. The matter was tried to the Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
on July 28, 1993. After the filing of various objections to the 
proposed findings, the court authorized the entry of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on June 14, 
1994 (R. 78-91). 
4. The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 20, 1994 (R. 95). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 10, 
1965 (R. 3, 103 at 4). The parties had three children born as 
3 
issue of the marriage, all of whom are emancipated (R. 103 at 
10). 
2. During the course of the marriage, the Defendant 
operated a business known as Dale Penrod Excavating (R. 103 at 7-
8). The Plaintiff worked at Smith's Food King as a checker 
during the last 10 years of the marriage and at the time of trial 
was working an average of 36 hours per week (R. 103 at 8-9). 
A. Real Property. 
3. The parties acquired approximately 3 acres of real 
property located in Utah County, State of Utah (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1, R. 103 at 12-13). The Plaintiff conceded that the 
property was inherited by the Defendant and should be awarded to 
him as his own separate property (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10; 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 11; R. 103 at 36-38, 47). 
4. In addition, the parties acquired a one-acre parcel 
upon which the parties' home was built. The property was 
conveyed to the Plaintiff and Defendant by the Defendant's 
father, Leroy W. Penrod on February 3, 1972 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2; R. 103 at 13-14). Subsequently, the one-acre parcel was 
conveyed by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant to the 
Defendant's brother, Mark C. Penrod on January 31, 1985 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3; R. 103 at 14). The Plaintiff 
testified that the home and property was conveyed to the 
Defendant's brother in order to circumvent a judgment from a 
lawsuit that had been filed against the Defendant (R. 103 at 14-
15). The parties continued to pay the mortgage on the home and 
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property from 1972 to the time of trial and no money was received 
from the Defendant's brother at the time of the conveyance (R. 
103 at 17-18). The Plaintiff valued the home and property at 
$108,400.00 minus the debt owing on the property of $4,775.00 for 
a net value of $103,625.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, R. 103 at 
18-19). 
5. The Defendant testified that the one-acre parcel was 
given to him by his father as part of his inheritance. The only 
reason that the Plaintiff's name appeared on the deed was to 
satisfy the requirements of the financing bank that both the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant's name be on the property (R. 103 at 
82-83). The Defendant testified that the value of the lot in 
1972 when it was conveyed to him by his father was $15,000.00 (R. 
103 at 83-84). 
6. The home and property was appraised as of October 1, 
1992 as having a fair-market value of $108,400.00 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 4). As depicted on the appraisal, three buildings 
were located on the one-acre parcel; a house, carport with 
storage area and a block shop. The block shop was used as part 
of the Defendant's business. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4, R. 103 
at 20-21). The portion of the appraised value of the property 
attributable to the block shop was $15,000.00 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 4, R. 103 at 21). 
B. Personal Property. 
7. The Plaintiff testified that her 1989 Jeep had an 
appraised value of $10,600.00 with a loan of $2,000.00, for a net 
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value of $8,600.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, R. 103 at 25). 
The Plaintiff valued the lawn mower and the household furniture, 
which she wished to be awarded at a total value of $6,000.00 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, R. 103 at 26-27). 
8. The parties stipulated that the appraised value of the 
vehicle and equipment to be awarded the Defendant was as follow: 
1957 GMC truck, ($1,800.00); a 1965 drop deck trailer 
($5,000.00); and, the 1979 traxcavator ($14,000.00). A 1985 
Dodge truck used by the Defendant had a value of $5,525.00 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, 8; R. 103 at 27-29). The Plaintiff 
testified that the Defendant had a bobtail (a small dumptruck). 
In addition the Defendant had a dune buggy and trailer valued at 
$3,000.00 and a restored Chevele, valued at $6,000.00 (R. 103 at 
29-31). The Defendant agreed with the values made by the 
appraisers. However the Defendant testified that the Chevele 
automobile was worth only three or four thousand dollars. The 
Defendant testified that the body had rust on it, was not 
restored to its original condition and was a mosaic of various 
parts from different types of vehicles (R. 103 at 85-86). 
9. The Plaintiff valued the Defendant's tools at 
$15,000.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, R. 103 at 31-34). The 
Defendant testified that many of the tools were inherited by his 
father. The only tools that were not inherited were comprised of 
a welder, a set of torches, compressor, drill press and various 
hand tools which the Defendant valued at $2,500.00 (R. 103 at 86-
87). 
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10. Additionally the Plaintiff claimed the Defendant had 
access to a bank account with a balance of $4,000.00 at the time 
of the separation (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9; Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 14, R. 103 at 31-34). 
11. The Plaintiff also testified that she valued the 
Defendant's business at $25,000.00 above the value of the assets 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, R. 103 at 31-34). The Defendant 
testified that he was the sole proprietor and the only person 
involved in the business. The Defendant testified that if he was 
not associated with the business, the business would have no 
income. Accordingly the Defendant testified that the business 
had no value other than the income produced (R. 103 at 84-85). 
C. Debts and Obligations. 
12. The Plaintiff testified that the only debts she was 
aware of consisted of the remaining obligation on the house and 
the debt owing on the Jeep which she was willing to assume (R. 
103 at 33-39). 
D. Alimony. 
13. The Plaintiff testified that she was born on October 
18, 1946 and was 46 years of age (R. 62). 
14. The Plaintiff testified, by way of her financial 
declaration that she had $1,739.00 in gross monthly income and 
$1,230.00 of net monthly income (R. 61). The Plaintiff conceded 
on cross-examination that she had been working nearly full-time 
over the past 10 years and had made $19,851.29 ($1,654.27 per 
month) in 1986 which by 1992 had escalated to $26,188.41 
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($2,182.37 per month) (Defendant's Exhibit No. 12; R. 103 at 47-
48). In fact, the Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledged that the 
income of the Plaintiff and that of the Defendant (subtracting 
only cost of business expense) from 1986 to 1992 was as follows: 
Year Plaintiff Defendant 
1992 $26,188.41 $ 2,890.00 
1991 $23,650.10 $ 7,231.00 
1990 $21,358.22 $ 6,387.00 
1989 $22,854.73 $14,562.00 
1988 $19,573.81 $17,295.00 
1987 $19,071.95 $13,724.00 
1986 $19,851.29 $19,530.00 
Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13; R. 103 at 49-53, 74-79. 
15. Although the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant 
had a drinking problem that kept him from working (R. 103 at 6), 
the Plaintiff acknowledged that two of the Defendant's largest 
customers had gone bankrupt. Additionally the Plaintiff could 
not name any specific jobs that the Defendant had turned down (R. 
103 at 53-57). 
16. The Plaintiff testified her monthly expenses were 
$2,494.00 (R. 58; 103 at 39-41). The Plaintiff also testified 
that she had a bulging disc and a spine that was narrowing that 
affected her when she stood for a long period of time (R. 103 at 
41-42). 
17. At the time of trial, the Defendant Dale Penrod was 47 
years of age and had a high school education. The Defendant had 
been an equipment operator for 25 years and owned his own 
business since 1977 or 1978 (R. 103 at 69-70). 
18. The Defendant testified that his business had decreased 
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because of an increase in competition and his inability to 
purchase a backhoe (costing approximately $150,000.00). The 
Defendant testified that there was only limited use for his 
traxcavator (R. 103 at 70-72). The Defendant testified that 
several of his major clients had gone out of business including 
Mark IV and West America Homes (R. 103 at 71-73). The Defendant 
indicated that he was simply unable to replace the lost major 
clients with new ones (R. 103 at 73). 
19. The Defendant testified that he had not turned down 
any work and that although he drank on occasion, drinking did 
not affect his work (R. 103 at 73). 
20. The Defendant testified that his gross income through 
June 17, 1993 was $9,387.50. After deducting the cost of gas, 
parts, taxes, insurance and utilities totaling $3,384.88, his net 
income through five and a half months was $6,002.62 ($1091.38 per 
month) (Defendant's Exhibit No. 15, R. 103 at 79-81). 
E. life Insurance. 
21. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant had a life 
insurance policy with Canada Life with a death benefit of 
$100,000.00 (R. 60; 103 at 42-43). 
F. Attorney Fees. 
22. The Plaintiff testified that she had incurred attorney 
fees in the amount of $2,350.00 (103 at 43). 
23. The Plaintiff acknowledged that she had $1,000.00 in 
savings, 15 shares of Smith's Food King stock and 220 shares of 
stock in a mutual fund that could be used to pay the attorney 
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fees (R. 103 at 61-66). 
24. The Defendant testified that he had incurred attorney 
fees in the amount of approximately $2,000.00 (R. 103 at 89-90). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion 
in awarding the Plaintiff alimony. The historical earnings of 
the parties and the uncontroverted testimony of both the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant establish that the Plaintiff's income 
is over twice that of the Defendant. Additionally, the court's 
award of additional temporary alimony amounts to reimburse the 
Plaintiff for voluntary contributions to a missionary are clearly 
improper and violative of established appellate court guidelines. 
Finally, the court's attempt to impute additional monies to the 
Defendant does not have any foundation in the testimony and 
evidence and are based upon insufficient findings relating 
thereto. 
The inclusion of a requirement that the Defendant maintain a 
life insurance policy with a death benefit of $100,000.00 naming 
the Plaintiff as sole beneficiary, is an abuse of discretion. 
The court reasoned that the life insurance requirement was 
necessary to secure the Plaintiff's alimony award. Inasmuch as 
there is no foundation in the record to support an award of 
alimony, the related requirement to maintain a life insurance 
policy should likewise be abated. If the requirement to maintain 
life insurance is somehow affirmed by this Court, the requirement 
should be in accordance with the trial court's direction. 
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Specifically the policy should be in an amount not greater than 
the present value of the alimony award based upon the Plaintiff's 
life expectancy. 
Lastly, the Defendant contends that all of the real property 
given to him by his father was in fact part of his inheritance 
and a gift to him. The Defendant contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in holding that the one-acre parcel, upon 
which the family home was built, was marital property. The value 
of that parcel should have been awarded to him as his own 
separate inherited property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF 
A. Standard of Appellate Review. 
The Defendant recognizes that the trial court is given 
considerable discretion to provide for spousal support and that 
any such award will not be over-turned on appeal unless there has 
been a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
B. Criteria for the Award of Alimony. 
The general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving 
spouse from becoming a public charge and to maintain to the 
extent possible the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 
(1994); Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1994); 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991). 
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In determining to award alimony and in setting the amount, 
the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
payor or spouse to provide support. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 
P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. Requirements for Specific Trial Findings. 
This Court has made it clear that if there is a factual 
basis and if the trial court has made adequate findings, the 
Appellate court will not disturb the trial court's alimony award 
unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. Schindler, supra. 
Moreover, "in considering these factors, the trial 
court is required to make adequate findings on all 
material issues, unless the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment." ? 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1990) quoting 
Throckmorten v. Throckmorten, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) 
quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce are attached as part of the Addendum as Exhibit 
I. The sections relevant to alimony are paragraphs 5 and 15 of 
the Findings which are mirrored in paragraph 2 of the Conclusions 
and paragraph 2 of the Decree. Findings numbered 5 and 15 are as 
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follows: 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly 
income is $1,779,00 and imputes to the Defendant 
monthly income in the sum of $2,383.00. Defendant's 
income is calculated based upon the testimony given at 
trial by the Defendant which showed that he worked 
twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty percent (60%) of 
his employment was billed at the rate of $65.00/hour 
and forty percent (40%) of his employment billed at the 
rate of $40.00/hour, that he worked nine (9) months 
during the year and that one-third (1/3) of his gross 
income was attributable to expenses and therefore that 
his yearly income amounted to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00 
per month. The Court further finds that Defendant 
earns $7,732.00 more than Plaintiff each year. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant 
were married for over twenty-seven (27) years and that 
Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that Defendant 
should pay to Plaintiff as alimony the sum of 
$672.00/month said alimony to be permanent. This 
finding is based upon the additional expenses which 
Plaintiff presently incurs as reflected on her 
Financial Declaration and which she anticipates will be 
reduced after ten (10) months and upon the Defendant's 
minimal expenses and his ability to pay. 
D. The Trial Court Findings with Regard to the Financial 
Conditions and Needs of the Plaintiff are Improper. 
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The trial court made a finding that the Plaintiff's yearly 
income was $20,868.00 which equates to a monthly income to a 
monthly income of $1,739.00 which is within $40.00 of the amount 
recited in paragraph 5 of the Findings (R. 85, 103 at 138). 
However, the court did not make either in his oral ruling 
from the bench or in the written Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree, any specific findings regarding the Plaintiff's monthly 
expenses and needs. The Plaintiff submitted a Financial 
Declaration showing monthly expenses of $2,494.00, but the court 
did not make any findings relative to those claimed expenses (R. 
58-62; 103 at 138-140). 
As outlined in the Findings and Decree, the court ordered 
the Defendant to pay an increased alimony award for ten months of 
$672.00 per month which then was reduced to $322.00 per month 
which was to be permanent alimony. The court's reasoning 
employed to support the $672.00 award was totally improper. The 
trial court awarded the extra $350.00 simply to compensate the 
Plaintiff for her voluntary contribution to a child on a church 
mission. Although not specifically included in the written 
findings, it is clear from the court's oral ruling what he 
intended: 
The expenses set forth in the Financial 
Declaration of the Plaintiff indicates her total 
monthly expenses are $2,494.00. Now, of that, 
$350.00 represents the amount going to support a 
missionary who apparently has been on his mission for 
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fourteen months and would have ten months to go . • . 
I am going to award her $322.00 per month alimony 
. what I'm going to do — it appears she has 
supported the missionary since he's been out. I didn't 
hear any other evidence . . . but what I'm going to do 
is award temporary alimony in the amount of $672.00 for 
ten months . . . 
R. 103 at 146-148. 
The $350.00 added alimony for the ten month period of time 
is clearly improper. The court is ordering the Defendant to pay 
support for an emancipated child. The parties stipulated and the 
Findings reflect that all three children born as issue of the 
marriage had attained the age of majority (Finding No. 4, R. 85). 
Although U.C.A. 15-2-1 allows a court to order support of a 
child to age 21, the court may do so only upon a finding of 
necessity and special or unusual circumstances. Balls v. 
Hackle, 745 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1987); Jackman v. Jackman, 696 
P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985); Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197 
(Utah App. 1993). In this case, the trial court simply referred 
to the voluntary contribution and made no findings relating to 
the child's need for the money or other special circumstances. 
It is clear that the child was not suffering from any mental or 
physical handicap or impairment. The court blatantly and 
improperly ordered the Defendant to make a voluntary contribution 
to his son's mission using alimony as a guise. 
In Chambers v. Chambers, supra the Court noted the 
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impropriety of including children expenses into an alimony award. 
Inasmuch as the court explicitly tied the Plaintiff's need 
for the extra $350.00 to her voluntary contribution to an adult 
child, the inclusion of that requirement on the Defendant by way 
of an alimony award is clearly outside the mandate of this Court 
as to the allowable basis for an award of alimony. 
One further item should be noted. Aside from being an 
improper attempt to order child support, the award is improper on 
another basis. This Court has ruled that alimony must be limited 
to provide for only basic needs and that a consideration of the 
recipient's station in life may be considered only when he is 
determined to have adequate resources. Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991); Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 
538, 542 (Utah 1991). 
The award of the $672.00 as temporary alimony is improper in 
that it was devised as a means to force the Defendant to 
contribute to Plaintiff's voluntary expenditures. Secondly the 
award is a guise for forced child support for an emancipated 
child. Third, the amount exceeds the base needs of the 
Plaintiff. 
E. The Trial Court Findings with Regard to the Defendant's 
Ability to Pay Alimony are Unsupported by the Evidence 
of Actual Earnings in the Case. 
In Finding of Fact No. 5, the trial court imputed $2,283.00 
of monthly income to the Defendant. The court does so based upon 
the following calculation: 
Defendant's income is calculated based upon the 
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testimony given at trial by the Defendant which showed 
that he worked twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty 
percent (60%) of his employment was billed at the rate 
of $65.00/hour and forty percent (40%) of his 
employment billed at the rate of $40.00/hour, that he 
worked nine (9) months during the year and that one-
third (1/3) of his gross income was attributable to 
expenses and therefore that his yearly income amounted 
to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00 per month. The Court 
further finds that Defendant earns $7,732.00 more than 
Plaintiff each year. 
R. 85. 
The Finding of the court as it relates to the Defendant's 
income has no basis in the record. Both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant testified that the joint tax returns, signed by both 
parties, demonstrated the following income. In 1986, the 
Defendant had $19,530.00 of annual income which equates to a 
monthly income of $1,627.50. In 1987, the Defendant had 
$13,724.00 of income equating to $1,143.00 per month. In 1988, 
the annual income was $17,295.00 or $1,431.25 per month. In 
1989, the Defendant's total income was $14,562.00 or $1,213.50 
per month. In 1990, the Defendant's total annual income was 
$6,387.00 or $532.25 per month. 1991 was only slightly better. 
The Defendant had $7,231.00 of income or $602.58 of monthly 
income. 1992 the Defendant's income was $2,890.00 or $240.83 per 
month. The Defendant testified that to the time of trial, his 
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net income for five and a half months was $6,002.62 or $1,091.38 
per month (R. Defendants Exhibit Nos. 12, 13 and 15; R. 103 at 
49-43, 74-79). As indicated by Defendant's Exhibits 12, 13 and 
15 and the graphic made apart of paragraph 14 of the Statement of 
Facts in this brief, the Defendant's income has never exceeded 
the Plaintiff's income from 1986 to the present. In fact, the 
Plaintiff's income has been at least twice as much as the 
Defendants from 1990 to the present. 
Based upon the jointly filed tax returns and the failure of 
either party to contend that the tax returns did not reflect 
their actual income, there is no question that the Plaintiff's 
income has historically, without exception, exceeded the income 
of the Defendant. Based upon the actual income of the parties, 
no alimony award would be justified. The court calculated 
alimony by taking the alleged difference between the annual 
income of the Plaintiff and the Defendant and dividing that 
number by twelve and than by two (R. 103 at 146-147). Obviously 
of the Plaintiff's income exceeded that of the Defendant, no 
alimony would be due under the standard and analysis employed by 
the trial court. 
F. The Trial Court Findings with Regard to the Defendant's 
Ability to Pay Alimony are Unsupported by the Evidence 
of Imputed Earnings in the Case. 
As outlined above, there is no question that the hard 
evidence of actual earnings do not support alimony to the 
Plaintiff. The only remaining analysis is an assessment of 
whether there is evidence upon which the court could, in good 
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faith, impute additional earnings to the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff testified that in her opinion, the Defendant 
had a drinking problem, which she surmised interfered with the 
Defendant's job performance (R. 103 at 6). However, the 
Plaintiff acknowledged that the Defendant had an excellent 
reputation and that she could not identify one person or client 
for whom Dale had refused to work (R. 103 at 6-7, 53-57). 
Although the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant charged 
$65.00 an hour on the cat and $40.00 per hour on the truck, she 
acknowledged that the Defendant could only work three or four 
months out of the year. In fact, the specific interchange with 
the Plaintiff and her counsel is as follows: 
Q. Yet when I look at your tax returns, it doesn't 
show that he made $10,000.00 per month for the whole 
year. Can you explain that? 
A, Because he only works three or four months out 
of the year. 
Q. So he'd work during the spring and summer? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Then not the rest of the year? 
A. No, not unless he worked on fixing up his 
equipment. 
R. 103 at 9-10. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff is consistent with the 
general notion that those persons employed in the construction 
field can not work the entire year because of weather and 
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temperature considerations. 
The Defendant testified that his family has always been in 
the equipment operating business and that he had been running his 
own business as an excavator since 1977 (R. 103 at 70). The 
Defendant's uncontroverted testimony, which was corroborated by 
the Plaintiff, was that his major clients had gone out of 
business and that he had been unable to replace them (R. 103 at 
54-55, 70-73). The Defendant testified that West American Homes, 
who had been his biggest and only client for a significant period 
of time, had gone out of business (R. 103 at 72-73). 
The Defendant denied that he had never turned down a job or 
been unable to perform because of drinking. No one had ever 
complained about his drinking and never interfered with the 
performance of his job (R. 103 at 73). 
On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that: 
A. He had worked for five hours the day before the 
trial (R. 103 at 94); 
B. That he billed $65.00 per hour for the cat and 
tried to charge $35.00 to $40.00 per hour for the 
truck (R. 103 at 100); 
C. When asked if he could estimate the percentage 
of time he worked at $65.00 per hour versus $35.00 
to $40.00 per hour, the Defendant testified that 
he worked a little over half to two-thirds with the 
cat and the other with the truck (R. 103 at 100-101); 
D. When asked to give an average of the number of 
20 
hours the Defendant worked a week, the Defendant 
testified that he could not. He stated that some 
weeks he worked and some weeks he didn't (R. 103 at 
102); 
E. Only when counsel for the Plaintiff asked the 
Defendant the number of hours he worked the previous 
week, was the Defendant able to answer that he 
worked approximately 20 hours (R. 102 at 103). 
The trial took place on July 28, 1993. The only testimony 
given by the Defendant above and beyond the hard evidence 
contained in the income tax returns and his year-to-date income 
statement (Defendant's Exhibit No. 15), was that in the week 
preceding July 28, 1993, the Defendant worked 20 hours. 
Finding of Fact No. 5 clearly states that "Defendant's 
income is calculated based upon the testimony given at trial by 
the Defendant which showed that he worked 20 hours per week." 
(R. 85). 
There is no question that the court's conclusion that the 
Defendant has the ability to make $28,600.00 per year or 
$2,383.00 per month is without any basis in the record. Since 
1986, the highest amount made by the Defendant was $19,530.00, in 
1986. The amount imputed by the court is $9,070.00 higher than 
any income made by the Defendant to date. To conclude that 
because the Defendant worked 20 hours in a week in July, he was 
capable of working that same amount for nearly 40 weeks is clear 
error. Even the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant's work 
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was limited to the Spring and Summer months. 
It must be remembered that the Defendant is not engaged in 
general construction which would allow him to work during 
approximately nine months of the year. The Defendant excavates 
or digs basements. Obviously that work would be done at a time 
of year that would still allow the construction of a home to its 
basic conclusion before the onset of inclement weather. 
Certainly the Plaintiff and Defendant, after having lived with 
the business since 1977, know its limitations and both testified 
that the excavation season was much more limited than the period 
of time pulled from the air by the trial court. There are simply 
no facts, adduced by either party that would support the income 
imputed to the Defendant. 
This Court has held that findings not supported by the 
evidence or those that are rendered in summary form will not be 
allowed to stand. See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 
App. 1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 
1989); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah App. 1987). 
As noted by the Court in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah 
App. 1992), the Court must do more than simply state or conclude 
that "the Defendant has the ability to pay." 
The Findings made by the trial court clearly fail to meet 
the test set out in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 
11 (1994): 
When the trial court has failed to make findings 
on the three factors listed above, we reverse, unless 
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pertinent facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. (Emphases added.) 
In this case, there are no findings that adequately attempt 
to extrapolate from the parties tax returns for eight years to 
the amount of income set out in the Findings. Without those 
specifics, the Findings are insufficient and cannot be 
sustained. In fact, the evidence in this case supports an 
appellate finding that the judgment should be set aside and that 
an order be entered abating the award of alimony. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN A $100,000 LIFE 
INSURANCE POLICY 
Paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact states as follows: 
Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance 
policy in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff 
as the sole beneficiary thereunder. Defendant is 
entitled to the cash value of any life insurance 
policies which he owns and is ordered to maintain a 
life insurance policy in the sum of $100,000.00 
naming the Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary there-
under free and clear from any encumbrances thereon. 
R. 82. 
The Defendant has two objections to the requirement of 
maintaining a life insurance policy. The first objection is 
that the life insurance was intended by the court as a guarantee 
of the Defendant's alimony obligation in the event the Defendant 
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preceded the Plaintiff in death. That fact, although not 
detailed in the written findings, is referenced in the court's 
ruling from the bench: 
MR. PETRO: So what's the holding then with 
regard to life insurance? 
THE COURT: That up to the $100,000.00 amount be 
maintained to protect Mrs. Penrod's interest in alimony 
for the rest of her life, $322.00 a month. If the 
present value of that is less than $100,000.00, I'll 
simply require him to maintain a sufficient amount to 
make sure that should something happen to Mr. Penrod, 
that she still receives the $322.00 a month. 
R. 103 at 149. 
Accordingly, if this Court finds that the alimony award to 
the Plaintiff is unjustified, the requirement to maintain a life 
insurance policy to secure the alimony, should be abated. 
The second objection of the Defendant is that the Plaintiff 
and her counsel failed to adhere to the instruction of the trial 
court. Judge Burningham clearly instructed counsel to determine 
the life expectancy of a person of the Plaintiff's age and 
calculate the present value of her alimony award. The Defendant 
was only to be required to maintain a policy that was equal to 
the value of the alimony award but did not exceed $100,000.00. 
Any casual reference to a life expectancy table under a heading 
of a Caucasian woman, age 48, will readily reveal that the 
alimony award is way over insured by a policy with a death 
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benefit of $100,000,00. 
In summary, the requirement to maintain a life insurance 
policy should be reversed with a finding by the Court that the 
alimony is unjustified• If for any reason, the life insurance 
requirement is maintained, the Defendant should not be required 
to maintain insurance with a benefit of more than the present 
value of the alimony award (based upon life expectancy tables). 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO COMPENSATE THE DEFENDANT FOR THE ONE-ACRE 
PARCEL RECEIVED AS PART OF HIS INHERITANCE 
The Plaintiff testified that the approximate three acres of 
property located behind the family home was undeveloped and given 
to the Defendant by his father, Leroy W. Penrod, as part of his 
inheritance. Based thereon, the court found that the 2.76 acre 
parcel should be awarded to the Defendant as his separate 
inheritance (Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 84). The court made the 
award even though the Defendant had transferred title of the 
property to the Plaintiff at the time the Defendant was sued (R. 
103 at 44-47). 
The Plaintiff testified that the one-acre parcel, upon which 
the family home was built was likewise acquired from the 
Defendant's father, Leroy W. Penrod by way of warrantee deed 
dated February 3, 1972 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2). The 
Plaintiff testified that the conveyance was made in order to 
allow the building of a home. The Plaintiff did not testify as 
to any conversation with Leroy W. Penrod wherein he acknowledged 
that the conveyance was anything other than a gift to Dale as 
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part of his inheritance (R. 103 at 12-14). 
The Defendant testified that the one-acre parcel was given 
to him by his father and that the only reason the Plaintiff's 
name was placed on the deed was to satisfy the bank from whom the 
loan to build the house was procured. The Plaintiff's name was 
placed on the deed only to facilitate financing (R. 103 at 82-
83). The Defendant testified that the value of the lot at the 
time he received it from his father was $15,000.00 (R. 103 at 
84). At the time the property was appraised, the lot was valued 
at $35,000.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4). 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that trial courts should, 
Generally award property acquired by one spouse by 
gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property 
acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its 
value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her 
efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the 
property has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest 
therein to the other spouse. 
See also, Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994). 
As the Court noted in Schaumberg, supra: 
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While a trial court has discretion to award inherited 
property, such property, "as well as its appreciated 
value, is generally regarded as separate from the 
marital estate and hence is left with the receiving 
spouse in a property division incident to divorce." 
See also, Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990); 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993). The 
Defendant recognizes that the court has authority to award 
inherited property to the other party but only in circumstances 
where it is done in lieu of alimony and in other extraordinary 
situations. Id. 
The evidence in this case is that the lot was given to the 
Defendant by his father as a gift and as part of his inheritance. 
The only reason the Plaintiff's name was put on the property was 
to facilitate financing and the procurement of a loan to build a 
house. That lot although used as the site of the family home, 
has a value which over time increased from $15,000.00 to 
$35,000.00. The lot's value was not enhanced by any efforts of 
the Plaintiff and can be separately valued a part from the house 
and related improvements. 
In keeping with the mandate of the appellate court, Finding 
No. 7 that the Defendant's father made a joint gift to the 
parties should be reversed and the value of the lot, as noted in 
the appraisal, should be awarded to the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The historical earnings of the parties, produced by all 
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sides, established that the Plaintiff, since 1986, has made more 
money than the Defendant. During the last years, the Plaintiff 
made from two to eight times the income produced by the 
Defendant. Based upon the uncontroverted evidence, no award of 
alimony should have been made to the Plaintiff. The granting of 
an increased temporary alimony award to reimburse the Plaintiff 
for contributions to an emancipated child, was clear error. 
Finally, there was no factual basis and insufficient findings to 
sustain the trial court's imputation of income to the Defendant. 
The order of the trial court with regard to life insurance 
should be reversed because it is tied to an alimony award that 
was improperly assessed. Additionally, the amount of life 
insurance violated the court's oral mandate and was far in excess 
of the present value of the alimony award. 
The court's finding that the one-acre parcel constituted 
marital property flies in the face of the evidence and the 
applicable case law. The Defendant, as part of the property 
settlement, should be awarded the value of the lot, at the time 
that the Decree of Divorc^jsgas entered. 
DATED this $&*- day of October, 1994. 
u^S^^ 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that ^^ copies of the Appellant's Brief were 
mailed, postage prepaid to Mr. Brian C. Harrison, Attorney at 
Law, 3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604 
on the S*' day of October, 1994. 
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE PENROD 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DALE PENROD 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
i Civil No. 924401632 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 28th 
day of July 1993, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney 
Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant appearing in person and by his 
attorney Michael J* Petro, and the Court having considered the 
evidence submitted by the parties and the argument of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant 
upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to 
become final upon entry. 
2. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as alimony the sum of 
$672.00 per month for ten (10) months after which alimony is 
reduced to $322.00 per month, said alimony award to be permanent. 
3. The Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half the 
equity in the home and real property of the parties which should be 
divided as follows: 
a. The home, carport, and three-quarters (3/4) acre on 
which the home and carport are situated is awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
b. The shop plus one-quarter (1/4) acre of the marital 
property is awarded to the Defendant. 
c. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to jointly 
petition the City of Provo for a lot split which would 
allow the shop and real property awarded to the Defendant 
to be attached to the adjoining property owned by the 
Defendant and his brother. 
4. Defendant is awarded the 2.76 acres adjacent to the 
marital property, as his separate inheritance. 
5. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
follows: 
a. Defendant is awarded the 1979 CAT, 1965 trailer, GMC 
truck, Dodge, Bobtail, dune buggy and trailer, Chevelle, 
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shop tools, bank account, family business (Dale Penrod 
Excavation), green chair, china closet, and two prints. 
b. Plaintiff is awarded the remaining household 
furniture and equipment, and Jeep. 
6. Defendant is ordered to record the unrecorded deed 
presently held by him covering the marital home and property, 
conveying the subject property from Mark Penrod to the Plaintiff 
and Defendant herein, and said property is then ordered divided as 
herein above specified. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the debts on the 
home and real property of the parties and on the Jeep which has 
been awarded to her. 
8. Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy 
in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff as the sole 
beneficiary thereunder free and clear from any encumbrances 
thereon. 
9. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all other marital 
debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage. 
10. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of the 
Smith's stock, Dean Whitter stock, and $500.00 from the joint bank 
account of the parties. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of 
Plaintiff's pension fund. Defendant is authorized to prepare a 
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Qualified Domestic Relations Order if the pension fund cannot be 
divided in any other fashion. 
12. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of 
$11,200.00 within six (6) months of the date of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein, with interest accruing thereon at the 
legal rate of interest from the date of said Decree until paid, 
said sum representing the difference between the value of the home 
and real property awarded to the Plaintiff and the property awarded 
to the Defendant. 
13. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to pay their own 
court costs and legal fees incurred herein. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce on this / / ) ' *-day of 
February, 1994, by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Michael J. Petro 
101 E. 200 S. 
Springville, UT 84663 
ecretary 
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE PENROD 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DALE PENROD 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924401632 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 28th 
day of July 1993, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney 
Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant appearing in person and by his 
attorney Michael J, Petro, and the Court having considered the 
evidence submitted by the parties and the argument of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are actual and bona-fide 
residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and have been for more 
than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
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action• 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 10, 
1965, in Mapleton, Utah, and are presently married at this time. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have developed between 
Plaintiff and Defendant which have caused the irremedial breakdown 
of the marriage. 
4. The parties have had three (3) children born as issue of 
the marriage but none of the children are presently under the age 
of majority. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly income is 
$1,779.00 and imputes to the Defendant monthly income in the sum of 
$2,383.00. Defendant's income is calculated based upon the 
testimony given at trial by the Defendant which showed that he 
worked twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty percent (60%) of his 
employment was billed at the rate of $65.00/hour and forty percent 
(40%) of his employment billed at the rate of $40.00/hour, that he 
worked nine (9) months during the year and that one-third (1/3) of 
his gross income was attributable to expenses and therefore that 
his yearly income amounted to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00 per month. 
The Court further finds that Defendant earns $7,732.00 more than 
Plaintiff each year. 
6. The Court finds that the ordinary expenses of the 
marriage were shared during the marriage and thus both parties 
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should be given equal credit for the mortgage payments made on the 
home and real property of the parties* 
7. The Court finds that in 1972 the Defendant's father made 
a joint gift to Plaintiff and Defendant of the one acre parcel upon 
which the parties constructed the marital home. 
8. The Court finds that the present net equity value of the 
home and real property of the parties is $103,625.00 and that each 
party should be awarded one-half (1/2) of the equity therein. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been a homemaker for 
over 27 years and has resided in the home of the parties for over 
20 years. 
The Court further finds that the home, carport, and the three-
quarters (3/4) acre on which the home and carport are situated 
should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that the shop plus one-
quarter (1/4) acre of the marital property should be awarded to the 
Defendant, so long as this division does not violate applicable 
zoning ordinances. 
9. The Court finds that the parties should jointly petition 
the City of Provo for a lot split which would allow the shop and 
real property awarded to the Defendant to be attached to the 
adjoining property owned by the Defendant and his brother. 
10. Defendant should be awarded the 2.76 acres adjacent to 
the real property of the parties as his separate inheritance which 
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the Court finds is valued at $385,000.00. 
11. With respect to personal property, the Court finds that 
Exhibit 9, items 1 - 6 , are not disputed in terms of valuation and 
the Court finds accordingly that the personal property to be 
awarded to the Defendant is as follows: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
• 
1. 
• 
1979 CAT 
1965 Trailer 
GMC Truck 
Dodge 
Bobtail 
Dune buggy and 
Chevelle 
Shop tools 
Bank account 
trailer 
Family business -
Dale Penrod Excavation 
$14r000 
$ 5,000 
$18,000 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
5,525 
1,000 
3,000 
4,000 
9,000 
4,000 
-0-
12. In addition, the Court finds that the green chair awarded 
to the Defendant is valued at $1,000.00 and that the China Closet 
and two prints should be awarded to the Defendant and that the 
other household furniture and equipment is valued at $4,000.00, and 
should be awarded to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff should be awarded 
her Jeep subject to assuming the debt thereon with an equity value 
of $8,600.00. 
13. The Court finds that the unrecorded deed presently held 
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by the Defendant covering the marital home and property should be 
recorded, conveying the subject property from Mark Penrod to the 
Plaintiff and Defendant herein and that said property should then 
be divided pursuant to the Decree herein. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should assume and pay 
the debts on the home and real property of the parties and the Jeep 
which are awarded to her. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant were married 
for over twenty-seven (27) years and that Plaintiff is in need of 
alimony and that Defendant should pay to Plaintiff as alimony the 
sum of $672.00/month for ten (10) months after which alimony should 
be reduced to $322.00/month said alimony to be permanent. This 
finding is based upon the additional expenses which Plaintiff 
presently incurs as reflected on her Financial Declaration and 
which she anticipates will be reduced after ten (10) months and 
upon the Defendant's minimal expenses and his ability to pay. 
16. Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy 
in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff as the sole 
beneficiary thereunder. Defendant is entitled to the cash value of 
any life insurance policies which he owns and is ordered to 
maintain a life insurance policy in the sum of $100,000.00 naming 
the Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary thereunder free and clear 
from any encumbrances thereon. 
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17. Defendant should assume and pay all other marital debts 
and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage. 
18. Plaintiff and Defendant should each be awarded one-half 
of the Smith's stock, and Dean Whitter stock, and $500.00 from the 
joint bank account of the parties. 
19. Plaintiff and Defendant should each be awarded one-half 
of Plaintiff's pension fund. Defendant is authorized to prepare a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order if the pension fund cannot be 
divided in any other fashion. 
20. The Court finds that the net equity in the home and real 
property of the parties is $93,475.00 minus the value of the 
personal property awarded to the Defendant in the sum of $71,075.00 
which equals $22,400.00 in joint marital equity which should be 
awarded one-half to each party. Accordingly, Plaintiff should pay 
to Defendant the sum of $11,200.00 within six (6) months from the 
date of entry of the Decree herein, with interest accruing thereon 
at the legal rate of interest from the date of the Decree until 
paid. 
21. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant should each 
pay their own court costs and legal fees incurred herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant 
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upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to 
become final upon entry. 
2. Defendant should pay to Plaintiff as alimony the sum of 
$672.00 per month for ten (10) months after which alimony is 
reduced to $322.00 per month, said alimony award to be permanent. 
3. The Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half the 
equity in the home and real property of the parties which should be 
divided as follows: 
a. The home, carport, and three-quarters (3/4) acre on 
which the home and carport are situated is awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
b. The shop plus one-quarter (1/4) acre of the marital 
property is awarded to the Defendant. 
c. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to jointly 
petition the City of Provo for a lot split which would 
allow the shop and real property awarded to the Defendant 
to be attached to the adjoining property owned by the 
Defendant and his brother. 
4. Defendant is awarded the 2.76 acres adjacent to the 
marital property, as his separate inheritance. 
5. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
follows: 
a. Defendant is awarded the 1979 CAT, 1965 trailer, GMC 
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truck, Dodge, Bobtail, dune buggy and trailer, Chevelle, 
shop tools, bank account, family business (Dale Penrod 
Excavation), green chair, china closet, and two prints, 
b. Plaintiff is awarded the remaining household 
furniture and equipment, and Jeep. 
6. Defendant is ordered to record the unrecorded deed 
presently held by him covering the marital home and property, 
conveying the subject property from Mark Penrod to the Plaintiff 
and Defendant herein, and said property is then ordered divided as 
herein above specified. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the debts on the 
home and real property of the parties and on the Jeep which has 
been awarded to her. 
8. Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy 
in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff as the sole 
beneficiary thereunder free and clear from any encumbrances 
thereon. 
9. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all other marital 
debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage. 
10. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of the 
Smith's stock, Dean Whitter stock, and $500.00 from the joint bank 
account of the parties. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of 
8 
Plaintiff's pension fund. Defendant is authorized to prepare a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order if the pension fund cannot be 
divided in any other fashion. 
12. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of 
$11,200.00 within six (6) months of the date of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein, with interest accruing thereon at the 
legal rate of interest from the date of said Decree until paid, 
said sum representing the difference between the value of the home 
and real property awarded to the Plaintiff and the property awarded 
to the Defendant. 
13. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to pay their own 
court costs and legal fees incurred herein. 
Approved as to form: 
Micha^dnr. Petro 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
this /Xrfo— day of February, 1994, by first-class U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael J. Petro 
101 E. 200 S. /y 
Springville, UT 84663 -*• -
Secretary 
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Tab 3 
DALE PENROD/ MARIE PENROD 
Gross Income Before Taxes 
1986 through 1992 
Year 
1992 
1991 
1990 
1989 
1988 
1987 
1986 
Marie 
$26,188.41 
$23,650.10 
$21,358.22 
$22,854.73 
$19,573.81 
$19,071.95 
$19,851.29 
Dak 
$2,890.00 
$7,231.00 
$6,387.00 
$14,562.00 
$17,295.00 
$13,724.00 
$19,530.00 
Tab 4 
DALE PENROD 
EXCAVATING INCOME AND EXPENSES 
1/1/93 to 6/17/93 
Gross Income to 6/17/93 $9,387.50 
Less Expenses: 
Gas 
Parts and Labor 
Tax and License 
Insurance 
Diesel Fuel 
Oil and Grease 
Shop Power & Phone 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
NET INCOME to 6/17/93 
$936.22 
$500.54 
$500.00 
$550.00 
$414.26 
$105.86 
$378.00 
$3,384.88 
6.002.62 
